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  1  
ABSTRACT 
Since the abolition of its Apartheid regime in 1994, South Africa has launched a massive program 
of education, which has been financed through resources representing on average 21% of the 
national budget or 7% of GDP. Today, the GDP share of public spending on education is 
1.3 times the average of industrialized countries (5.4%) and almost twice that of 
developing countries (3.9%). 
In this paper, we simulate fiscal policy experiments to analyze the growth and welfare effects of a 
shift in the allocation of government expenditures between public spending on education and 
transfers as well as those of a change in the tax rate in a model of endogenous growth with 
human capital accumulation for the South African economy.   
The results of simulations demonstrate that a shift in the allocation of fiscal resources 
between educational spending and transfers does not affect the long run allocation 
decisions. In the transition, however, this shift generates a negative effect on the rate of 
growth of GDP. In fact, a reallocation of expenditures shifts resources away from saving 
and toward consumption, and translate into lower rate of growth but higher welfare. 
Nonetheless, these growth and welfare effects are very small. On the other hand, a tax cut 
generates growth effects in the long run as well as in transition. In fact, reducing or 
cutting the tax rate in the long run lowers the interest rate, which in turn creates 
disincentives for saving and results in low rate of growth of GDP. However, in the 
transition, it reduces or removes distortions and translates into high work effort, high 
accumulation of human capital, and thus high rate of growth of GDP. Nonetheless, its 
welfare effect is negative.  
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In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of the relationship 
between fiscal policies, growth, and welfare in models of endogenous growth. This 
analysis has two distinct strands in literature. The first strand is based on the view that 
government expenditures are unproductive consumption of economic resources and tax 
rates are distortionary. Studies in this line of research include, among others, King and 
Rebello (1990), Lucas (1990), Rebello (1991), Jones et. al (1993), Stokey and Rebello 
(1995), Razin and Yuen (1996), and Ortigueira (1998). These studies reach the 
conclusions that income taxation is negatively related to the long run rate of growth of  2  
the economy, and that the welfare costs of taxation are larger in these models than they 
are in exogenous models.  
The second strand in literature, however, is based on the view that not all 
government expenditures are unproductive and that some affect the productivity of the 
economy in different ways. For instance, public expenditures allocated to the 
maintenance and/or construction of public infrastructure improves the productivity of 
physical capital, whereas those allocated to education and health enhance the productivity 
of labor. Early contributions to this topic include Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-
Matin (1992). These papers show that public spending may be growth-promoting. 
Furthermore, they show that the size of the effect depends on the characteristics of the 
services and the policy design. Precisely, if the public services are publicly provided 
public or private goods, lump sum taxation creates high incentives for investment and 
growth. On the other hand, income taxation leads to higher growth if the public services 
are subject to congestion. 
Most models built to study the effects of productive public spending on growth 
include public spending as an input of the final good production sector. This is the 
approach followed by Barro (1990), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992, 1995, 2005), Corsetti and Roubini (1996). These studies specify a Constant 
Returns to Scale (CRS) production function in both inputs but diminishing returns in each 
of them. However, there is no obvious reason to restrict public expenditures to affecting 
only the productivity of the final good production sector since they can serve different 
purposes. Jones et al (1993) takes a different approach by building them into the physical 
capital accumulation technology which they specify as a Constant Elasticity of  3  
Substitution function. Corsetti and Roubini (1996) build them as either an input of a final 
good production sector or an input of human capital accumulation sector. In both cases, 
their production functions take the CRS form. Agenor (2005) and Greiner (2006) 
construct them to affect only the productivity of human capital accumulation sector using 
the CRS technology. 
In this paper, we build on the two strands of the literature to analyze the growth and 
welfare effects of a shift in the allocation of public expenditures between spending on 
education and transfers as well as those of a reduction in the tax rate or of a 100% tax cut 
in a model of endogenous growth with human capital accumulation of the South African 
economy. South Africa has launched since the abolition of its Apartheid regime in 1994 a 
massive program of education. According to Schmidt (2003), the resources allocated to 
this program have represented on average 21% of the South Africa's national budget or 
7% of its GDP for the period 1995-2001. The size of this share has made education the 
largest single item in the national budget of this country, and one of the highest 
proportions worldwide. Today, it is 1.3 times the average of industrialized countries 
(5.4%) and almost twice that of developing countries (3.9%). Does allocating more fiscal 
resources to education make any difference? What can possibly be the effects of reducing 
or eliminating them. 
To answer these questions, we formulate first a simple model of endogenous growth 
with human capital accumulation of Lucas’ type and solve it under the parameters 
estimated from the data and long run equilibrium conditions (baseline). Then, we 
simulate four fiscal policy experiments and compare their solutions to that of the baseline 
case to assess and analyze growth and welfare effects.  The first and second experiments  4  
consist of reducing the GDP share of spending on education to the averages of 
industrialized and developing countries, respectively; while the third and fourth consist of 
eliminating transfers and government from the model, respectively. In both the baseline 
and the simulated experiments, we restrict the analysis to services from government 
spending flows (exogenously given) rather than stocks of public expenditures.  
The Lucas' model has well known long run properties. As documented in the seminal 
paper by Lucas (1988), the economy converges to the balanced growth path in which all 
variables grow at constant (possibly zero) rates. Furthermore, its transition properties, 
which were unclear in this original paper, have been described in a number of subsequent 
studies on this topic. Important contributions in this line of research include Mulligan and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992), Caballe and Santos (1993), Ortigueira (1998), Boucekkine and 
Tamarit (2004), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004), and Boucekkine et al (2007), 
among others. These studies show that the transition behavior of the economy is 
determined by the relative size of the parameter of substitution and the elasticity of 
physical capital. If the parameter of substitution is greater (less) than the elasticity of 
physical capital, an economy starting with higher physical-human capital ratio than that 
of the long run equilibrium will observe higher (lower) transition rates of growth of 
human capital than that of the long run equilibrium, and lower (higher) transition rates of 
growth of physical capital than that of the long run equilibrium. The transitions from low 
physical-human capital ratio are obtained by applying symmetrically the above results. 
Our specification of the human capital accumulation technology with public 
spending on education differs slightly from the ones in the studies mentioned above. 
While the human capital accumulation technology in all these studies is CRS in all inputs  5  
and diminishing in each of them, we adopt as Lucas (1998) a linear technology so that 
diminishing returns do not occur. As far as we know, this study is the first one to extend 
the Lucas framework to the one that includes government expenditures as an input of the 
human capital accumulation sector. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze a 
simple model of endogenous growth with human capital and characterize its equilibrium. 
In section 3, we solve numerically the model. Section 4 includes the comparison of the 
predictions of the model to the data. In Section 5, we simulate four fiscal policy 
experiments. In Section 6, we analyze growth and welfare effects of fiscal policy 
experiments. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
2. Model of Endogenous Growth with Human Capital and Policy  
2.1 Setup   
We consider a decentralized Ramsey model a la Lucas with unbounded horizon and 
continuous time. The economy is closed and populated by many infinitely-lived, rational, 
and identical agents with homothetic preferences, many competitive firms with identical 
technology, and a government. A single consumption good is produced in this economy 
from a technology that combines physical capital ( ) ) ( t k  and effective labor ( ) ) ( ) ( t h t u - a 
combination of raw labor  ( ) ) ( t u  with human capital ( ) , ) ( t h . 0 ‡ t We assume that 
population is constant over time. 
A representative-agent derives her utility from consuming  ) (t c  units of the 
consumption good in each period (leisure does not enter the utility function). Let assume 
that agent’s preferences are characterized by a twice continuously-differentiable utility  6  
function  ( ) ) ( t c U  with   0 > ¢ U  and  0 < ¢ ¢ U , for all  0 ) ( > t c , and satisfies the Inada 
conditions, that is,  ( ) ¥ = ¢
ﬁ ) ( lim
0 ) ( t c U
t c  and  ( ) , 0 ) ( lim
) ( = ¢
¥ ﬁ t c U
t c  where U¢  and U ¢ ¢ are the 
first and the second derivatives of the utility function, respectively. The discounted sum 
of future utilities of the representative agent is given by: 






1,  ( ) 1 . 2  
where c is measured in units of final output, and r  is the constant parameter of time 
preference. We assume that the representative agent supplies raw labor inelastically, 
where the supply of labor in each period is normalized to one. She has to decide on the 
fraction of labor to allocate to production  ( ) u  and the fraction to allocate to the 
accumulation of human capital ( ) u - 1  in each period . t  She receives a wage rate w  in 
exchange for supplying one unit of effective labor ( ) uh  and a rate of return r  for renting 
one unit of physical capital  k  in each period t , wherew  and r  are measured in units of 
consumption good  . c  She also receives a lump sum transfer T  from government in each 
period  . t  Raw labor u  and human capital  h  are perfect substitutes. In each period  , t  she 
allocates her total income to spending on consumption  c  and to saving  . k &  Thus her 
budget constraint is given by: 
( ) ( ) T c rk wuh k k u + + - - + - = p t t 1 1 & ,  ( ) 2 . 2  
where p  is profit earned by the agent who holds  N 1  fraction of the firm’s shares, N is 
                                                 
1 From now on, we do not explicitly indicate the time dependence of variables if no ambiguity arises.  7  
the size of population,  k t is a flat rate of tax on capital income , and u t is a flat rate of tax 
on labor income. Human capitalh is accumulated according to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) h g f h u h h h d j - + - = 1 &   ( ) 3 . 2
2                   
where  h g is a stream of exogenously given government spending on education,  (.) j  is a 
decreasing function in  , u and  ( ) . f  is an increasing function in  . h g  We restrict the 
analysis to the educational services from government spending flows rather than a stock. 
( ) 3 . 2  implies that the rate of accumulation of h  in each period t   is a function of the time 
spent on the learning field, the existing stock of  , h and the public spending on education 
in that period. Furthermore, the representative agent starts with some positive 
endowments of physical and human capital, that is: 
0 ) 0 ( k k = ,  0 ) 0 ( h h = ,  0 k  and  0 h  are given.  ( ) 4 . 2  
We also assume that all decision variables take on only non-negative values: 
0 ‡ c ,  0 ‡ k ,  0 ‡ h ,  . 1 0 £ £ u   ( ) 5 . 2  
The supply side of the model consists of a representative competitive firm producing 
the consumption good  y from a technology that combines physical capital 
f k and 
effective laborz . The profit function of this firm in each period t  is:  
                                                 
2 k &  is saving net of depreciation and h & is the rate of accumulation of human capital net of depreciation. 
The above implies that there exist gross rates of accumulation of k and  , h  which are given by   
k k k k d + = ¢ & & and  , h h h h d + = ¢ & & respectively; where  k d and  h d  are the rates of depreciation of                                                                                                 
k and  , h respectively. It follows from the above that   k k k k d - ¢ = & & and  . h h h h d - ¢ = & &   8  
, wz rk y
f - - = p              ( ) 6 . 2  
where
f k  and  z   are the firm’s demands of physical capital and effective labor, 
respectively, and  y  is its output produced according to: 
( ) z k F y
f , =
3 ,  ( ) 7 . 2  
whereF  is a Constant Returns to Scale ( ) CRS technology in 
f k  and  . z  This function is 
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable in each argument with  , 0 > ¢ F   , 0 < ¢ ¢ F  
and satisfy the Inada Conditions: 










  ( ) , 0 ,. lim = ¢
¥ ﬁ
f
z k F and  ( ) . ,. lim
0 ¥ = ¢
ﬁ
f
z k F                   
We assume also that: 
  , 0 ‡ y   0 ‡
f k ,  . 0 ‡ z   ( ) 8 . 2  
A government intervenes in this economy through a fiscal policy, that is, it collects 
taxes on incomes, and uses the proceeds to make lump sum transfers to consumers and to 
finance education. Its budget constraint, which by assumption must be balanced in each 
period, and the boundary conditions on the tax rates are respectively: 
, rk wuh g g T g g k u T h h t t h h + = + = + =          t "        ( ) 9 . 2   
1 0 £ £ u t ,  . 1 0 £ £ k t   ( ) 10 . 2  
where  h h  and   T h are respectively the constant budget shares of public spending on 
education and on transfers,  . 1 = + T h h h  The assumption of a balanced budget for the 
                                                 
3 The production function in the Lucas’ model has an external effect from human capital. We omit it here to 
ease the derivation of the Balanced Growth Path conditions.  9  
government is intended to prevent it from running a deficit that it would finance by 
issuing debt (which it would pay by increasing the tax rates), or running a surplus by 
accumulating assets.  
2.2 Equilibrium and its Characterization 
 A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of allocations of the 
representative agent{ } , , , , 0
¥
= t u h k c  a sequence of allocations of the representative firm 
{ }
¥
= 0 , , t
f z k y , a sequence of the rental rates of  { }
¥
= 0 , t w r  and a sequence of policies 
{ }
¥
= 0 , , , t h k u T g t t such that: 
) i Given { }
¥
= 0 , t w r and { } , , , , 0
¥
= t h k u T g t t { }
¥
= 0 , , , t u h k c  maximizes  ( ) 1 . 2  subject to 
( ) ( ) , 5 . 2 2 . 2 -  
) ii The rental rates of physical capital and effective labor in each period t  are given by: 
( )
f f k z k F r ¶ ¶ = , ,  ( ) , , z z k F w
f ¶ ¶ =   ( ) 11 . 2  
) iii The government budget constraint ( ) 9 . 2  and the boundary conditions on the tax rates 
( ) 10 . 2  hold in each period , t  
) iii  The following feasibility conditions hold in each periodt : 
y k g c h = + + & , k k
f = ,  . uh z =   ( ) 12 . 2  
Let assume that the utility function, the production function, and the functions 




1 c c U ,   ( ) ( )
a - a
=
1 , z k A z k F
f f ,   ( ) ), 1 ( 1 u u - = - f j ( ) , g g f x =   ( ) 13 . 2  
where  s  is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution,  A  is the 
technology parameter, a  is the output's share of physical capital, f  is the human capital 
technology parameter, and x  is a constant parameter. The Current Value Hamiltonian is: 
()()() [] ()() [] g h u g c rk wuh
c
J h h h k u k xh f l h t t l
s
s




1 1 1 1
1
1
45,   
where c and u  are the control variables, k  and h are the states variables,  k l  and  h l  are 
the co-state variables or the shadow prices of physical and human capital, respectively. 
k l and h l  are derived from the co-state variables  k m and  h m  of  k and  h  in 
P J as 
follows: 
t
k k e m
r l = , 
t
h h e m
r l = . The first-order conditions from maximizing  J  are: 
, 0 = -
-
k c l
s                                                        t "   ( ) 14 . 2  
( ) ( ) ( ) , 0 1 1 = + - - h g w h h u k xh f l t l                     t "   ( ) 15 . 2  
( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 g c rk wuh k h k u h t t - + - - + - = &   ( ) 16 . 2  
( )( ), 1 g h u h h xh f + - = &   ( ) 17 . 2  
( ) [ ], 1 r t l l - - - = r k k k &   ( ) 18 . 2  
                                                 
4 We omit profit in J  since it is zero in each period due to CRS specification of the production function. 
5 J  is derived from the Present Value Hamiltonian, that is, 
t Pe J J
r = , where 
P J  is given by: 
()()() [] ()() [] g h u m g c rk wuh m e
c
J h h h k u k









1 1 1 1
1
1
  11 
( ) [ ]. ) 1 ( 1 r f l t l l - - - - - = u wu h u k h &   ( ) 19 . 2  
The boundary conditions are the initial conditions ( ) 4 . 2  and the following transversality 
conditions ( ): TVC   
( ) ( ) 0 lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t k e t
t
k t
r l ,  ( ) ( ) . 0 lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t h e t
t
h t
r l   ( ) 20 . 2  
Taking the log and time-derivative of  k l in( ) 14 . 2 and substituting the resulting expression 
into( ) 18 . 2 yield the following equation of motion of  : c   
  ( ) [ ]. 1
1 r t s - - =
- r c c k &   ( ) 21 . 2  
Manipulating ( ) ( ) 19 . 2 14 . 2 -  we get the following equations of motion of u
6: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ + - - + - + =
- - - 1 1 1 1 1
a a a t fxh f xh a a uh Ak u h g h g u u k h h &  
            ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )] h h k k h g h & & - -xh a 1   ( ) 22 . 2  
Given the initial conditions ( ), 4 . 2 expressions ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 22 . 2 , 21 . 2 , 17 . 2 , 16 . 2 and the 
TVC ( ) 20 . 2  form the dynamic system describing the evolution of this economy over time.  
2.3 Steady State 
Let assume that the equilibrium paths converge to the balanced growth path ( ) BGP  
in which all variables grow at constant (possibly zero) rates. Let define these rates by: 



































= g   ( ) 23 . 2  
                                                 
6 See Appendix A1 for the derivation of the equations of motion ofu .  12 
From equation  ( ) 21 . 2  and using  ( ) 11 . 2
7and the definition of the BGP ( ) 23 . 2 , we 
derive the following marginal products ofk:  
  ( ) ( ) , 1
1 1
c k uh Ak sg r a t
a a + = -
- -         ( ) 24 . 2  
which is constant along the  . BPG  Substitute( ) 11 . 2  for r and winto( ) 16 . 2 , divide by  k , 
and use the definition ( ) 23 . 2  for  k k &  to obtain:  
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 k k c k u h k c g t a sg r a t a t h - - + + - - =           ( ) 25 . 2  
which is constant along the  . BPG  Taking the log and time-derivative of ( ) 25 . 2  yields 
0 / / = - k k c c & & , that is, cand k  grow at the same rate ( ). g g g = = k c  Moreover, divide the 
feasibility condition ( ) 12 . 2  by  k  to get: 
( ) ( ) .
1 1 a a - - = + + uh Ak k g c k h &      ( ) 26 . 2  
Multiply the LHSof  ( ) 26 . 2  by  k k & & /  , use definition ( ) 23 . 2  for k k &  , inverse the resulting 
expression, and rearrange to obtain the savings rate ( ): s       
          ( ) ( ). 1 sg r g t a + - = k s    ( ) 27 . 2  
Divide the government budget constraint ( ) 9 . 2  by  k  and substitute ( ) 11 . 2  for r and w 
into the result to get: 
                                                 
7 The rental rates r and w  are given by: 
( ) ,
1 1 a a a
- - = uh k r ( ) ( ) . 1
a a a
- - = uh k w   13 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( ). 1 1 k k u k g t a sg r a t a t - + + - =   ( ) 28 . 2  
Differentiating  ( ) 28 . 2  we get  , 0 / / = - k k g g & &  that is,  g and  k  grow at the same rate 
( ). g g g = = k g  Furthermore, taking the log and time-derivative of  ( ) 24 . 2
8  yields 
, 0 / / = - k k h h & & that is, hand k  grow at the same rate ( ). g g g = = k h  Next, multiply both 
sides of  ( ) 28 . 2  by  h k  to obtain: 
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )( ). 1 1 h k h g k k u t a sg r a t a t - + + - =   ( ) 29 . 2  
Recovering  h k  from ( ) 24 . 2
9 and substituting its expression into ( ) 29 . 2  yields: 
, u h g y =   ( ) 30 . 2  
where  () [] ()() () . 1 1 1 1
1
- - - + + - = a
a
a t a sg r a t a t y k k u A   
Taking the log and time-derivative of ( ) 14 . 2  and of ( ) 15 . 2  yields: 
. sg l l l l - = = h h k k & &   ( ) 31 . 2  
Divide ( ) 19 . 2  by  h l , substitute ( ) 15 . 2  into the resulting expression, and rearrange to get: 
( ) . u h g h h h fxh f r l l - - = &   ( ) 32 . 2  
Set ( ) 31 . 2  and ( ) 32 . 2  equal to obtain: 
( ) ( ) . h u h g fxh sg f r + - =   ( ) 33 . 2  
                                                 
8 To get this result we have assumed that  0 = = u u u g & . We will show that this is indeed the case. 
9  ()() [ ]
( )






t a sg r &   14 
Divide ( ) 17 . 2  by  , h  use definition( ) 23 . 2 , and rearrange the resulting expression to get:  
( ) ( ) ( ). 1 f g xh xh - = + - u h g h g u h h   ( ) 34 . 2  
Substitute ( ) 30 . 2  and ( ) 33 . 2  into ( ) 34 . 2  and rearrange to obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]. 1 1 1
1
1 f f r s g y xh - + + - - =
-
h u   ( ) 35 . 2  
Taking the log and time-derivative of  ( ) 35 . 2  yields  0 = g = u u u & . Furthermore, it is 
obvious from ( ) 11 . 2 that the rates of growth of r  and w are zeros( ). 0 = = w r g g  However, 
the growth rate of w augmented for skill growth is  .
* g g g g = + = h w w  This is also the rate 
of growth GDP as can be verified by differentiating the expression of GDP in ( ). 13 . 2  
From all of the above, it is obvious that in the  ; BGP   , , , , g h k c and w augmented for skill 
growth grow at the same constant rate  ( ) g g g g g g = = = = =
*
w g h k c ; and  , u , r w are 
constant( ). 0 = = = w r u g g g  The common rate of growth g  is recovered from ( ) 27 . 2 . It 
is: 
( ) ( ). 1 s t a r g s s k - - =   ( ) 36 . 2  
We use the above common rate of growth g  to normalize variables as follows: 
t ce c
g - = ˆ , 
t ke k
g - = ˆ , 
t he h
g - = ˆ ,  . ˆ
t ge g
g - =  
The dynamic system of the normalized variables is formed by the following: 
() () [] ( ) ( ) , ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 ˆ
1
c k h u k A k k u h - - + - - =
-
g a t a t h
a a &  
() ( ) , ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ h g h u h h g xh f - + - = &   15 





Ø - - - =
- - - gs r a t s
a a
h u k A c c k &  
() ( ) [ ] ( ) () ( ) + Œ º
Ø - - + - + =
- - - 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
a a a t fxh f xh a a h u k A u h g h g u u k h h &  
            ( ) ( ) ()() () () ( ) ( ) { - - - - + - -
- - k c h u k A h g u k h h ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ 1
1 1 a a t a at h xh a  
              ( ) ( ) ( )}] h g u h ˆ ˆ 1 1 xh f + -   
: TVC   ( ) ( ) 0 ˆ lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t k e t
t
k t
r l ,  ( ) ( ) . 0 ˆ lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t h e t
t
h t
r l   ( ) 37 . 2  
TheTVC  in ( ) 37 . 2  imply that the vector  ) (t x approaches its steady state, that is: 
¥ < =
¥ ﬁ ss t x t x ) ( lim  «  ( ) 0 =
¥ ﬁ ) ( / ) ( lim t x t x
t
&   
where  ( ) u h k c t x , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ) ( = . The steady state conditions are obtained by dividing the four 
equations in  ( ) 37 . 2  by  , ˆ c , ˆ k , ˆ h and , u respectively, and by manipulating the resulting 
expressions. They are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ], 1 1 1
1
1 f f r s g y xh - + + - - =
-





ˆ 2 1 g
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sg r
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=   ( ) 38 . 2  
The steady state values of the static variables are:   16 
( ) ( ), 1 k ss r t gs r - + = ( ) ( ) [ ] , 1 ) 1 (
) 1 /( - - + - =
a a t a gs r a k ss A A w             
() [] ( )
a a a t a t
-
+ - =
1 ˆ 1 ss ss ss k u ss h u Ak g   ( ) 39 . 2  
3. Numerical Solution 
The dynamic system described in  ( ) 37 . 2  does not admit a closed-form solution. 
Therefore we resort to the numerical solution. We use the relaxation algorithm
10 to solve 
numerically this dynamic system given the boundary conditions (initial and terminal 
conditions). The initial conditions include the initial conditions on the state variables 
( ) h k,  and some arbitrary guess on the control variables( ) u c, . The terminal conditions are 
the steady state conditions on the state and control variables. The algorithm transforms 
the infinite time variable into the time scale to facilitate the solution to the problem. It 
tries an arbitrary solution to both the state and control variables, assesses the deviation of 
the arbitrary solution to the true path by a multi-dimensional error function, and then uses 
the derivative of this function to boost the guess in an iteration of a Newton procedure 
type. At each point of the path, the adjustment is related to the incorrectness in slope and 
in the static equations’ solution. The algorithm keeps adjusting the trial until it reaches an 
optimal solution, that is, the one for which the error becomes sufficiently small.   
We use the relaxation algorithm as well as the estimated values of parameters 
summarized in Table 1 to solve numerically the dynamic system described ( ). 37 . 2  The 
numerical solution to the model is given by the time paths of variables as depicted in 
Figure 1. As can be noticed, the system is globally saddle point stable. In fact, 
                                                 
10 See Timborn, Koch, and Steger (2004) for the description and the implementation of the algorithm.  17 
u r g y k h c , , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ  and w converge to their steady state values, which are reached after 46 
years or in 2040. Plus, in the steady state, a representative agent spends 67.70% of her 
time working and 32.30% accumulating human capital. Also, the interest and wage rates 
in the steady state are 15.84% and 1.2968, respectively. The steady state interest rate 
obtained from the model seems very close to data. For instance, in 1996, the Reserve 
Bank raised its rate to 17%, which induced commercial banks to increase theirs to 20%. 
The transition behaviors of variables are explained by the relationship between the initial 
and steady state ratios of physical to human capital. Graph v in this Figure 1 shows that  
Table 1: Parameters' Values
11 
A  a  0 k   0 h   f  x   u k t t =   h h   r  s   s 
1.00 0.451  11. 56  6.03  0.116  0.034  0.25 0.27  0.068 0.10 1.46 
the path of the ratio of physical to human capital is a straight line through the origin 
(other paths of this ratio are possible). This shape is the result of the absence of external 
effects from human capital in the model.  It suggests that the initial ratio of physical to 
human capital is greater than its steady state ratio, that is, physical capital is abundant 
relative to human capital in the initial period. Recall that the case we are exploring here is 
the same as the one described in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, that is, the share of physical 
capital a  is less than the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution s  and h ˆ 
is scarce relative to . ˆ k  To correct for the imbalance between  k ˆ and  , ˆ h h ˆ has to rise 
                                                 
11 The estimation procedure is explained in Appendix A2.  18 
monotonically toward its steady state value, while  k ˆ  has to decrease monotonically 
towards its steady state value so that the ratio  h k ˆ ˆ is decreasing (Graphs ii and iii). While 













































































FIGURE 1: Time-Paths of Per Capita Consumption, Human Capital, Physical Capital, Raw Labor, GDP, Gov-Expenditures, and of Ratio of Physical to Human Capital, Wage Rate, and Interest Rate*
*Per Capita Consumption, Human Capital, Physical Capital, GDP, and Gov-Expenditures are normalized
 
graph iii is consistent with the monotonic increase in  , ˆ k  graph ii shows instead that h ˆ 
increases monotonically to reach its maximum, beyond which it starts to decrease until it 
reaches its steady state. Further, an initial high ratio  h k ˆ ˆ implies high wage (high 
productivity of human capital), to which agents respond with high willingness to work.  
As a result, u increases until it reaches its steady state. Also, a decrease in the ratio h k ˆ ˆ  
causes  r  to increase monotonically towards its steady state, and  w ˆ  to decrease 
monotonically towards its steady state since this ratio is negatively related to the former 
and positively related to the latter. Plus, from the expression of  , ˆ y  it is obvious that a  19 
decrease in  h k ˆ ˆ  is expected to cause a decrease in . ˆ y  However, the expression of 
y ˆ includes alsoh ˆ which is expected to impact positively  . ˆ y  The shape of the time-path of 
y ˆ suggests that the negative effect of  h k ˆ ˆ  on  y ˆ dominates the positive effect of h ˆ on  y ˆ  
so that  y ˆ  decreases monotonically until it attains its steady state. Furthermore, the 
transition behavior of  c ˆ  can be inferred using the balance conditions. From these 
conditions,  c ˆ  can be expressed as the difference between output and the sum of 
educational spending and investment in  physical capital,  . ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ k k g y c h g h - - - = &  Thus, the 
shape of the path of  c ˆ  suggests that the sum of the second, third, and fourth terms 
dominates the first term during the transition so that c ˆ has to decrease monotonically 
towards its steady state.  
The dynamic system of the normalized variables is a working device we used to 
obtain convergence. However, our variables of interest are the un-normalized ones. So 
we use the normalized variables to recover the rate of growth of the un-normalized 
variables. These rates of growth are depicted in Figure 2. In the BGP, in fact, this figure 
suggests that  g y k h c , , , , and  * w  grow at the same constant rate of 3.47%; while  r u,  and 
w do not grow. In the transition, on the other hand,  w g y k c , , , ,  and  * w grow at 
increasing rates, while  , ,u h and r grow at decreasing rates. The transition median rates of 
growth are 1.355% for  , c -0.455% for  , k 3.001% for  y and  , g -2.855% forw, 1.433% for 
*, w 1.568% for  , u  and 3.476% for  . r  
The above results are consistent with the predictions of the Lucas' model as concern 
the individual behaviors of variables in the transition as well as in the BGP. In fact, the   20 












































































































FIGURE 2: Time-Paths of Per Capita Consumption, Human Capita, Physical Capital, Raw Labor, GDP, Gv-Expenditures, and of Interest Rate, Wage Rate, and Wage Rate Augmented for Skill Growth
 
shapes of paths of variables as well as those of their rates of growth are similar to the 
ones predicted in the studies cited in the introduction.  
4. Comparison of the model’s predictions to the data 
In this section, we compare the model’s solution to data to see whether or not it is 
capable of describing well the growth process of the South Africa’s economy from 1995 
on. We limit this comparison to variables whose data exist on the per year basis. Two 
variables meet this requirement, namely, Per Capita Consumption and Per Capita GDP. 
The data we use for this purpose are those on the rates of growth of these variables from 
the WDI as well as those on their levels from Summers-Heston Penn World Tables 6.2.  
Starting with GDP, we can see from Figure 4 that the rates of growth of Real Per 
Capita GDP generated from the model are close to the filtered data on this variable over  21 
the period 1995-2005. This conclusion is unchanged when we use the levels of Real Per 
Capita GDP. As is shown in Figure 5, the Real Per Capita GDP from the model tracks the 
data very well although the data start to deviate slightly after the 7
th year.  
 
FIGURE 4: Comparison of Model Predictions to Data 















On the other hand, the model series on Real Per Capita Consumption does not seem 
to mimic data closely. In fact, Figure 4 shows that the rate of growth of this variable from 
data is decreasing to reach the minimum and then starts to increase, while the one from 
FIGURE 3: Comparison of Model Predictions to Data 


















ydotyModel  22 
the model is increasing monotonically. Also, although the two rates are increasing after 
the 5
th period, the gap between them is widening over time. Furthermore, this widening 
gap is also present between the levels of Real Per Capita Consumption from the model 
and from the data as can be seen in Figure 5.  
We can supplement the above graphical analysis with a statistical one by using the 
Theil Inequality Coefficient( ). U  This statistics measures the predictive performance of a 
model and is bounded below by one and above by zero. Its expression is as follows: 
() ()
() () () ()
[] 1 , 0

































t Y and 
D
t Y are the values of the variable from the model and the data, respectively, 
FIGURE 5: Comparison of Model Predictions to Data 
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t Y Y =  and a 
value of U of one indicates a bad predictive performance of the model. Using the series 
generated by the model and those from the data over 1995-2005 we find different values 
of  , U which are summarized in table 5. As it was the case for the graphical analysis, the 
GDP series track the actual data very well. In fact, the values of U for the rate of growth 
(0.0133) as well as the level of Per Capita Real GDP (0,0293) are very close to zero. 
However, the consumption series seem to mimic the actual data but not so closely. In fact, 
the values of U for the rate of growth (0.4090) as well as the level of consumption  
Table 2: Theil Inequality Coefficient (U) 
 Rate of Growth Levels 
U (Real Per Capita GDP) 0.0133 0.0293 
U (Real Per Capita Consumption)  0.4090 0.1250 
(0.1250) are far from one but still not close to zero. This indicates that the predictive 
performance of the model with respect to the level of consumption is good but this 
performance with respect to rate of growth of consumption is just fair. 
5. Simulation of Fiscal Policy Experiments 
As indicated in the introduction, South Africa has allocated on average 7% of its 
GDP or 21% of its budget to spending on education since 1995. This share is 1.3 times 
the average of industrialized countries (5.4%) and almost twice that of developing 
countries (3.9%). Does allocating more resources to education make any difference? We 
simulate different fiscal policy experiments to answer this question. Specifically, we 
consider the cases of shifting the allocation of government expenditures between public  24 
spending on education and transfer while maintaining the tax rate constant (Experiments 
1 and 2), that of combining this shift with a tax reduction (Experiments 3), and that of 
cutting totally the tax rate (Experiment 4). These experiments are described in the next 
paragraph. Further, we compare the results of these experiments to the baseline case to 
analyze the growth and welfare effects. We should stress that the baseline case is the one 
associated with the parameters of the basic solution of the previous section, that is, 
, 25 . 0 = = u k t t   , 27 . 0 = h h  and  73 . 0 = T h
12.  
Experiment 1 consists of reducing the GDP share of public spending on education to the 
share of industrialized countries (5.4% of GDP or 20.83 of national budget) while 
maintaining the tax rate constant. This shift represents a decrease of 22.857% in  h h  or an 
increase of 8.454% in  . T h  Experiment 2 is similar to Experiment 1 in its structure. 
However,  h h  is reduced to the share of developing countries (3.9% of GDP or 15.043% 
of national budget). This shift is equivalent to a decrease of 44.286% in  h h  or an increase 
of 16.308% in  . T h  Experiment 3 consists of shifting the allocation of public expenditures 
between public spending on education and transfers and of decreasing the tax rate. In this 
experiment, we increase  h h  to one, which is equivalent to decreasing  T h to zero. Also we 
decrease the tax rate from 0.25 to 0.07. This is equivalent to an increase in  h h  of 
270.370% or a decrease of 100% in  T h combined with a decrease of 72.000% in the tax 
rate. In other words, this experiment consists of eliminating transfers from the model 
while maintaining the same GDP share of educational spending. Experiment 4, finally, is 
about eliminating government from the model. In fact, in this experiment, we set the tax 
rate to zero. This is equivalent to decreases in the tax rate of 100% or to no government 
policy. The results of simulation of the four experiments are summarized in Tables 2 and 
                                                 
12 The value of  h h has been adjusted from 21% to 27% to satisfy the assumptions of balanced budget in 
closed economy. See Appendix A2 for details.   25 
3 for the BGP and transition dynamics, respectively. Indeed, the BGP paths of 
Experiments 1 and 2 are the same as those of the baseline case (columns 2 and 3). The 
common rates of growth of  * , , , , , w g c h k y and of  w r u , ,  are 3.47% and 0%, respectively. 
Also, the levels of un-normalized variables are also the same. In fact, the representative 
agent still spends 67.7% of her time to production and 32.3% to the accumulation of 
human capital. Also, the interest rate and the wage rate are the same as in the baseline 
case, that is, 15.84% and 1.297, respectively. However, the BGP of Experiments 3 and 4 
differ from that of the baseline except for the common rate of growth of  , ,r u  and . w  
Indeed,  , , , , , g c h k y  and  * w  grow at lower rate than in the baseline case. Their rate of 
growth is 2.710% in Experiment 3 and 2.190% in experiment 4. Also, the interest rate is 
lower in each of those experiments. It is 11.58% in Experiment 3 and 10.00% in 
Experiment 4. Nonetheless, the labor supply and the wage rate are higher in each of them. 
The representative agent allocates 83.81% and 94.94% of her time to production 
activities and 16.19% and 5.06% to schooling in Experiment 3 and 4, respectively. Her 
wage rate is 1.6773 in Experiment 3 and 1.8922 in Experiment 4. 
Table 2: BGP’s Results of Simulation of Fiscal Policy Experiments 
Variables Policy Exp 1  Policy Exp 2  Policy Exp 3  Policy Exp 4 
  Common Rates of Growth (in %) 
* , , , , , w g c h k y   3.470 3.470 2.710 2.190 
w r u , ,   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Levels of Un-Normalized Variables 
u   0.6769 0.6769 0.8381 0.9494 
r  0.1584 0.1584 0.1158 0.1000 
w  1.2968 1.2968 1.6773 1.8922  26 
 
The transition dynamics in each of the 4 experiments look similar to the baseline ones as 
concerns the shapes of variables as well as concerns those of their rates of growth (we do 
not plot these variables to economize space). In fact,  w g y k c , , , ,  and  * w grow at 
increasing rates, while  , ,u h and r grow at decreasing rates.  Their median rates of growth, 
which are displayed in Table 3 show variations across these experiments.  
Table 3: Transition Dynamics’s of Simulation of Policy Experiments 
Variables Policy Exp 1  Policy Exp 2  Policy Exp 3  Policy Exp 4 
  Median Rates of Growth (in %) 
y   2.978 2.957 3.300 3.579 
h  4.271 4.256 4.847 5.999 
k   -0.483 -0.493 -1.491 -4.159 
u   1.550 1.534 2.389 3.935 
c  1.358 1.358 0.623 -1.064 
r   3.461 3.450 4.791 7.738 
w  -2.843 -2.834 -2.872 -6.356 
* w   1.428 1.422 0.991 -0.357 
 
6. Growth and Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy Experiments 
In this section we assess and analyze the long run and transition growth effects 
(Tables 4 and 5) and the welfare effects (Table 6) in each of the four experiments.   27 
First, a shift in the allocation of expenditures between public spending on education 
and transfers (Experiments 1 and 2) does not have any effects on the allocation decisions 
in the long run. Indeed, agents choose the same rates of growth of all variables in the 
baseline case. By contrast, a shift in the allocation of expenditures coupled with a 
reduction in the tax rate or a 100% tax cut does affect the long run allocation decisions. In  
fact, a decrease of 72% in the tax rate combined with the elimination of transfers 
(Experiment 3) or a tax cut of 100% (Experiment 4) results in low interest rate. 
Compared to the baseline case the rate of growth of the interest rate decreases by 
26.895% in Experiment 3, and by 36.859% in Experiment 4. Also, a low tax rate induces 
agents to choose lower rate of growth of  , k  which is also the rate of growth of  , , , , g c h y  
and  . * w  With respect to the baseline, this growth rate decreases by 21.900% in 
Experiments 3 and by 36.869% in Experiment 4. At the same time, a decrease in the tax 
rate induces high wage rate. The wage rate increases by 29.341% in Experiment 3 and by 
45.913% in Experiment 4 compared to the baseline. Further, a wage differential between 
the  baseline  and  each  of  the  two experiments  makes  working  more  attractive than 
learning. So agents respond to the high wage with high work effort. Indeed, they increase 
their supply of labor by 23.796 in Experiment 3 and by 40.263% in Experiment 4. In both 
of the two experiments, however, the effects are moderate since the tax is decreased by 
72% and 100% in Experiments 3 and 4, respectively. 
Turning now to the transition, we can see from Table 5 that a shift in the allocation of 
expenditures, a shift coupled with a tax reduction, and a 100% tax cut do affect the rate of 
growth of all variables. In fact a shift has a negative effect on the rate of growth of GDP 
in Experiment 1 (-0.776%) and in Experiment 2 (-1.466), whereas a shift coupled with a  28 
tax reduction and a 100% tax cut have positive effects on this rate in Experiment 3 
(9.963%) and in Experiment 4 (19.260%); respectively. These effects on the rates of 
growth of GDP are the results of the combined effects of public policies on  , h , k and u in 
each of these experiments. These effects can be analyzed directly using the dynamic 
system formed by equations ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 22 . 2 , 21 . 2 , 17 . 2 , 16 . 2  and the static equations given in 
footnote 7. 
In Experiment 1, a decrease of 22.857% in  h h  or an increase of 8.454% in  T h  shifts 
resources toward transfers, which agents use to increase their consumption. But an 
increase in consumption for a given level of income results in low saving and in low rate 
of growth of  k compared to the baseline or a negative effect of -1.684%. Also, a decrease 
in  h h  has negative effects on the accumulation of h and  . u  Indeed, the rates of growth of 
Table 4: BGP’s Growth Effects of Fiscal Policy Experiments 
Variables Baseline Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 3 Exp 4 
  R G (%) Growth Effects on Rates of Growth (in %) 
* , , , , , w g c h k y   3.470  0.000 0.000 -21.900 -36.889 
w r u , ,   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Levels Growth Effect on Un-normalized variables 
u   0.6770 0.000 0.000 23.796 40.263 
r  0.1584 0.000 0.000 -26.895 -36.869 
w  1.2968 0.000 0.000 29.341 45.913  29 
h and u decreases by 0.394% and by 1.173%, respectively. Plus,  h h  does not affect 
directly  , ,r y  and  , w  but through  , ,h k and  . u  The combined negative effects of a 
decrease in  h h  on  h k,  and u translates into negative effects on the rates of growth of 
GDP and  r  of -0.776% and -0.432%, respectively, and in a positive effect on  w  of 
0.420%. Intuitively, an increase in transfers shifts resources toward consumption but 
away from saving. This results in higher consumption but low rate of accumulation of k  
compared to the baseline case. At the same time, higher transfers create disincentives 
regarding labor supply and results in low work effort compared to the baseline. Moreover, 
a low supply of labor has a positive effect on the accumulation of  . h  But this positive 
effect on h is outweighed by a negative effect of a decrease in  h h  on hso that the net 
effect is negative. This negative effect implies that h accumulates slowly compared to 
the baseline. We should stress that although a decrease of 22.857% in  h h  generates 
growth effects, these effects are very small. Put differently, decreasing the share of public 
spending to the proportion of industrialized countries does have negligible effects on the 
rate of growth of GDP as well as on those of the other variables in the economy as long 
as the resources generated are used to increase transfers.  
In Experiment 2, a decrease of 44.286% in  h h  does generate negative growth effects 
on the rates of growth of  k  (-0.400%), u (-2.149%), h (-0.732%), r (-0.742%), but a 
positive growth effect on that ofw(0.385%). Additionally, the combined negative effects 
of this decrease on  h k,  and u  translate into an negative effect on the rate of growth of 
GDP of -1.446%. The results of this experiment are the same as those of Experiment 1 as 
concern the direction of the effects but slightly different as concern their sizes. In fact, a  30 
decrease in  h h  in this experiment is almost twice that of Experiment 1. Coincidently, the 
effects of this decrease on , , , h u y and  r  are almost twice those of the corresponding 
effects in Experiment 1. However, that on k is one fourth and that on w is almost the 
same as the corresponding effect in Experiment 1. Compared to Experiment 1, this is an 
indication that a large shift in the allocation of expenditures amplifies the effects on 
, , , h u y  and  , r  but  not k  and  . w  Also, since  the  effects  in  this experiment move in the 
Table 5: Transition Growth effects of Fiscal Policy Experiments 
Variables Baseline 
Policy 










Growth Effects on Rates of Growth (in %) 
y   3.001 -0.776 -1.500 9.968 19.260 
h  4.289 -0.394 -0.732 14.638 39.848 
k   -0.475 -1.684 -0.400 -215.368 -775.579 
u   1.568 -1.173 -2.149 52.360 150.982 
c  1.355 0.044 0.221 -54.050 -174.759 
r   3.476 -0.432 -0.742 37.846 122.617 
w  -2.885 0.420 0.385 -0.603 -122.627 
* w   1.433 -0.384 -0.712 -36.343 -124.920 
  31 
same direction as those in Experiment 1, the intuition behind the behaviors of variables is 
the same as the one described in the previous paragraph (Experiment 1).  As it was the 
case in Experiment 1, decreasing the share of spending on education to the proportion of 
the developing countries generates very small growth effects as long as the resources 
generated are allocated to transfers.  
Moving now on to Experiment 3, we can see from Table 4 that eliminating transfers 
while maintaining the share of the educational spending to 7% of GDP, which is the same 
as decreasing the tax rate by 72.000% and increasing  h h by 270.370%, results in a 
positive effect on the rate of growth of 9.963%. Indeed, increasing  h h by 270.370% lower 
the income available to the agent while reducing the tax rate by 72.000% increases it. The 
end result is that the effect of the former dominates that of the latter so that the net effect 
is low saving and thus low rate of growth of k or a negative effect of -215.368%. Also, 
the elimination of transfer has a negative effect of -52.022% on the rate of growth of 
consumption. Plus, a decrease in the tax rate and an increase in budget share of 
educational spending have opposing effects on the supply of labor. Although the effect of 
the former is negative, that of the latter is positive and dominates. In fact, the net effect is 
an increase in the rate of growth of labor supply of 52.360% compared to the baseline. 
Indeed, reducing the tax rate creates more incentives for high work effort. Also, high 
labor supply combined with high  h h  results in high accumulation of h  compared to the 
baseline or a positive effect on its rate of growth of 14.638%. The combination of the 
positive effects on the rates of growth of h and u  dominates the negative effect on k  and 
translates into a positive effect on the rate of growth of GDP of 9.963%. This dominance 
also implies that wage rates grow slowly compared to the baseline or a negative growth  32 
effect of -0.603%. However, the combined positive effects of this shift and the tax 
reduction on the rates of growth of h  and  , u  and their negative effect on k  result in a 
positive effect of 37.846% on the interest rate. So the interest rate grows faster in this 
experiment than it does in the baseline case. The effects of this fiscal policy experiment 
vary from small ( ) w  to moderate ( ) r c u h y , , , ,  to large( ). k  
 The last experiment –Experiment 4- is similar to the previous one as concern the 
direction of the effects. Indeed, a tax cut of 100% has positive effects on y (19.260%), 
h(38,869%), u (150.982%), and r (122.617%); but negative effect on k (-775.579%), c 
(-174.579%) and  w  (-122.627%). In fact, cutting tax removes all the distortions and 
improves the efficiency of the allocation of labor between working and schooling. In 
other words, cutting tax creates incentives for high supply of labor and results in a 
positive effect of 150.982% on its rate of growth compared to the baseline case. Also, 
high supply of labor means less time spent on the learning field, which would suggest 
that human capital accumulates slowly compared to the baseline. However, this is not the 
case. Indeed, although labor supply grows faster in this experiment compared to the 
baseline, it starts and stays below that of the baseline for a quite amount of periods
13. 
Consequently, time spent on the learning field is higher in this experiment for a certain 
number of periods, implying that human capital grows faster or a positive effect of 
38.869% with respect to the baseline. Meanwhile, efficiency requires that the rate of 
accumulation of physical capital be reduced since it is abundant compared to human 
capital. This results in a low rate of growth of physical capital or a negative effect of -
                                                 
13 The labor supply in initial period is 0.5904 and 0.4121 in the baseline and experiment 4, respectively.   33 
775.579%. The combined effects on   k h,  and u  translate into positive effects on  , ,r y  of 
19.260%, 122.617%, respectively; and on a negative effect of -122.627% on  . w  Unlike 
the previous experiments, this one generates moderate to large growth effects.  
Regarding the welfare effects of the four fiscal policy experiments, we can see from 
Table 6 that Experiments 1 and 2  are associated with positive welfare effects but these 
effects are very small (less than 1%). Nonetheless, Experiments 3 and 4 have negative 
effects on welfare. In fact, the welfare decreases by 4.888% in Experiment 3 and by 
16.568% in Experiment 4.  
Table 6: Welfare Effects of Public Policies (in %) 
Variable Baseline  Exp 1 Exp2 Exp 3 Exp4 
Welfare Value  -0.58245 -0.58235 -0.58225 -0.61092 -0.67895 
Welfare Effect   - 0.025 0.035 -4.888 -16.568 
 
To sum up, a shift in the allocation of government expenditures between public 
spending on education and transfers (Experiments 1 and 2) generates negligible growth 
and welfare effects. Plus, a shift coupled with a tax reduction (Experiment 3) or a 100% 
tax cut (Experiment 4) generates small welfare effects. Nonetheless, it has mixed growth 
effects, that is, it generates small effects on some variables but large effects on some 
other variables. 
Now, how are the results of this study compared to those of the previous ones. To 
our knowledge, there do not exit results from previous studies to which we can directly 
confront ours. However, some share a great deal of issues explored here. For instance,  34 
Agenor (2005) explores the growth effects of a shift in allocation of public spending 
between education and public infrastructure to find that a reallocation of resources has a 
large impact on long run growth for some choice of parameters but limited effects for 
some other choice of parameters. This finding is totally different from the results 
obtained here. In fact, a shift does not have any long run effect on growth. The difference 
in the results of our study and his resides in the specification used and in the nature of 
policies. Their specification of the human capital accumulation function includes public 
spending on education and public infrastructure while the latter variable is absent in our 
model. Plus, public infrastructure as well as spending on education is considered as a 
productive spending while transfers are considered as unproductive expenditures. The 
different nature of the two spending makes the comparison even harder. The transition 
behaviors of variable are also un-comparable. Indeed, this paper uses the ratio of 
variables while we use the rates of growth of the levels of variables. 
Other papers that provide a basis for comparison are John et al. (1993), Corsetti and 
Roubini (1996), and Greiner (2006). The last two papers not only build spending on 
education in the human capital function but also predict the long run behaviors of 
variables that are consistent with our results of Experiments 3 and 4, that is, an tax on 
capital income distorts allocation decisions and does not correct for the externalities 
generated by public good. However, these papers do not quantify the effects, making thus 
the comparison more difficult. The paper by John et al. (1993) provides insight into the 
issue since it includes productive spending into the physical capital accumulation 
function and transfers. The results of simulations from this paper, unlike ours, show large 
welfare effects of change in fiscal policy. Additionally, the growth effects are larger in  35 
this paper while they are mixed in our. We should stress that the difference in the results 
is explained by the difference in the structure of our models as well as the procedure used 
to assess the effects. In fact, building productive spending in human capital function is 
not the same as building it in the physical capital accumulation function. Also, while this 
paper builds on the optimal taxation, we use the flat tax rate as reflected in the data.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have formulated a model of endogenous growth with human capital 
accumulation to analyze the growth and welfare effects of a shift in the allocation of 
public expenditures between spending on education and transfers as well those of a shift 
coupled with a tax reduction or those of a 100% tax cut. South Africa has launched since 
the abolition of its Apartheid regime in 1995 a massive program of education, which has 
been financed exclusively through fiscal resources representing on average 7% of its 
GDP or 21% of its national budget. This share is 1.3 times the average of industrialized 
countries (5.4%) and almost twice that of developing countries (3.9%).  
To analyze the growth and welfare effects mentioned above, we have simulated four 
fiscal policy experiments. The first and second experiments (Experiments 1 and 2) have 
consisted of reducing the budget share of spending on education to the averages of 
industrialized and developing countries, respectively, while using the generated resources 
to increase transfers. In the third experiment (Experiment 3), we have eliminated transfers 
in the model while maintaining the GDP share of spending on education constant. In the 
last experiment (Experiment 4), we have eliminated government in the model.  
The numerical solution to the model (baseline case) has demonstrated that the South 
Africa’s economy converges after 46 years from 1995 or in 2040. In the long run or BGP,  36 
physical capital, human capital, consumption, government expenditures, wage augmented 
for skill growth, and GDP grow at a constant rate of 3.47%; while the interest rate, wage 
rate, and labor supply do not grow. The transition dynamics to the BGP are characterized 
by two different patterns, that is, physical capital, consumption, wage rate, wage rate 
augmented for skill growth, government expenditures, and GDP grow at increasing rates, 
whereas human capital, the interest rate, and labor supply grow at decreasing rates. 
Additionally, the graphical as well as the statistical analyses have indicated that the 
model describes the growth process of the South Africa’ economy pretty well.  
In the next step, we have simulated a solution to each of the four fiscal policy 
experiments and then compared it to the baseline’s solution to assess and analyze growth 
and welfare effects. The solution to each experiment is qualitatively similar to that of the 
baseline. In fact, not only the economy converges after 46 years, but also the BGP as well 
as the transition behaviors are similar.  
The comparison of the solutions of these experiments has revealed what follows. 
First, reallocating public expenditures between spending on education and transfers does 
not have any effects on the BGP, whether the reallocation is operated through the 
reduction of the GDP share of educational spending to the average of industrialized 
countries (Experiment 1) or to that of developing countries (Experiment 2). However, an 
elimination of transfers coupled with a tax reduction (Experiment 3) or a 100% tax cut 
(Experiment 4) does indeed affect the BGP but the effects are moderate. The effects on 
the common rate of growth and on the interest rate are negative while those on the supply 
of labor and the wage rate are positive. Intuitively, in the absence of labor-leisure choice 
a labor income tax is neutral, that is, reducing a labor income tax does not modify agents’  37 
behaviors. However, a reduction of a capital income tax (Experiment 3) or a 100% tax 
cut (Experiment 4) does affect negatively the return on physical capital, which in turn 
creates disincentives for high accumulation of physical capital and high rate of growth. 
Second, in transition, a reallocation of government expenditures whether operated 
through a reduction of the GDP share of educational spending to the average of 
industrialized countries (Experiment 1) or that of developing countries (Experiment 2) 
does generate growth and welfare effects but these effects are very small. Indeed, this 
reallocation shifts resources away from saving and toward consumption and results in 
low rate of growth of GDP. As an implication, the rate of growth of consumption as well 
as the welfare is higher compared to the baseline. Also, it is associated with high rate of 
growth of the wage rate. However, its rate of growth of the interest rate is low. Also it 
creates disincentives for accumulation of physical and human capital and induces low 
work effort since agents receive additional income from transfers. On the other hand, a 
tax reduction coupled with the elimination of transfers (Experiment 3) or a 100% tax cut 
(Experiment 4) generates positive growth effects on the rates of growth of GDP, human 
capital, labor supply, and the interest rate but negative growth effects on the rates of 
growth of consumption (welfare), physical capital, and the wage rate. These effects vary 
from small to moderate to large. Indeed, a tax reduction or a 100% tax cut reduces or 
removes distortions and creates incentives for high rates of growth of labor supply, 
human capital, and the interest rate. Nonetheless, its associated rates of growth of the 
wage rate and physical capital are low.  38 
Third, the welfare effects associated with Experiments 1 and 2 are positive but very 
small. By contrast, those associated with Experiments 3 and 4 are negative and vary in 
size. They are small in Experiment 3 but moderate in Experiment 4.  
In terms of policy recommendation, the concern now is which one of the four 
experiments is recommendable? There does not exist a clear cut answer. Indeed, 
Experiments 1 and 2 are good on the welfare ground but bad when it comes to growth. 
On the other hand, Experiments 3 and 4 perform well on the growth ground but are worse 
on the welfare ground. Clearly, growth and welfare do not go one to one in each of the 
four experiments. This is to say that the choice will depend on the objective pursued by 
the government. 
This study can be extended in several directions. First, transfers can be disaggregated 
in order to identify the other expenditures that qualify as productive so as to include them 
in the appropriate sectors. Our choice to treat expenditures other than educational ones as 
transfers was motivated by the concern to ease the derivation of the BGP. The 
disaggregation may provide new insights and lead possibly to different results. For 
instance, these transfers include expenditures such as health, social infrastructures 
(housing, special development initiatives), promotion of industrial development, research 
and technology development, and competitiveness fund and sectoral partnership facility. 
Some of these expenditures can enter the production function while other can enter the 
physical capital accumulation function. Second, we have compared the results of each 
experiment to the baseline case. This, however, does not prevent us from comparing the 
results of Experiment 4 to that of Experiment 3. In other words, if we consider 
Experiment 3 as our baseline and try to assess the effects of moving from this experiment  39 
to Experiment 4, we can see that the effect on the rate of growth of GDP is negative in 
the BGP but positive in transition, while the effect on welfare is negative. The BGP effect 
on the rate of GDP is consistent with the predictions in Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992). However, the transition effects, which are not explored in these studies, 
suggest that educational spending is not productive. The question is whether these 
spending are not really productive or the policy design used in this study is not 
appropriate. As indicated in the mentioned studies, a publicly provided private good as 
education must be primordially financed through a consumption tax. Thus, Experiment 3 
can be re-specified by replacing the labor income tax and capital income tax by a 
consumption tax, and solved numerically before to draw a definitive conclusion.   40 
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Appendix A: Equation of motion of u in Model 1 
Let rewrite the first order conditions -conditions ( ) ( ) 19 . 2 14 . 2 -  in the text- as: 
, 0 = -
-
k c l
s                                                       t "       ( ) 1 . A   
( ) ( ) ( ) , 0 1 1 = + - - h g w h h u k xh f l t l                   t "    ( ) 2 . A  
( ) ( ) ( ) , 1 1 1 g c rk wuh k h k u h t t - + - - + - = &   ( ) 3 . A   
( )( ), 1 g h u h h xh f + - = &   ( ) 4 . A   
( ) [ ], 1 r t l l - - - = r k k k &   ( ) 5 . A   
( ) [ ]. ) 1 ( 1 r f l t l l - - - - - = u wu h u k h &   ( ) 6 . A  
Plus the boundary conditions, that is, the following TVC and initial conditions: 
( ) ( ) 0 lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t k e t
t
k t
r l ,  ( ) ( ) , 0 lim =
-
¥ ﬁ t h e t
t
h t
r l   ( ) 7 . A  
0 ) 0 ( k k = ,  0 ) 0 ( h h = ,  0 k  and  0 h  are given.   ( ) 8 . A  
Taking the log of ( ) 2 . A  yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1 ln 1 ln ln ln ln
1 h g h g w u h k x x f t l l » + = - + + -
-   ( ) 9 . A  
In  ( ) 9 . A  we have approximated ( ) ( ) h g x + 1 ln  by  ( ) h g x following a similar 
approximation used in Enders (2006), p.107. Taking the time-derivative of ( ) 9 . A  after 
substituting ( ) 11 . 2  forw, and rearranging yields: 



















































a xh a   ( ) 10 . A   44 
Divide ( ) 5 . A  by  k l  and substitute for r to obtain: 
( ) ( ) . 1
1 1 a a a t r l l
- - - - = uh Ak k k k &   ( ) 11 . A  
Divide( ) 6 . A  by h l , substitute ( ) 2 . A  into the resulting expression, and rearrange yields: 
( ) . u h g h h h fxh f r l l - - = &   ( ) 12 . A  
Substituting ( ) 11 . 2  for r and , w  and ( ) 9 . 2  for g into( ) 3 . A  and dividing by  k  yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ). 1 1
1 1 k c uh Ak k k k u h - + - - =
- - a a a t a t h &   ( ) 13 . A  
Dividing ( ) 4 . A  by  h  it comes: 
( ) ( ) ( ). 1 1 h g u h h h xh f + - = &   ( ) 14 . A  
Substitute ( ) ( ) 14 . 11 . A A -  into ( ) 10 . A   and rearrange to get:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ + - - + - + =
- - - 1 1 1 1 1
a a a t fxh f xh a a uh Ak u h g h g u u k h h &  
            ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { - - - - + - -
- - k c uh Ak h g u k h h
1 1 1 1 1 1
a a t a at h xh a  
             ( ) ( ) ( )}]. 1 1 h g u h xh f + -   ( ) 15 . A  
We can see from ( ) 15 . A  that the expression inside the braces is  . h h k k & & -  So we  rewrite 
( ) 15 . A  as: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ + - - + - + =
- - - 1 1 1 1 1
a a a t fxh f xh a a uh Ak u h g h g u u k h h &  
            ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )], 1 h h k k h g h & & - -xh a   ( ) 16 . A  
which is exactly the equation ( ) 22 . 2  in the text.  45 
Appendix B: Parameters’ Estimation 
To solve the dynamic system described in ( ) 37 . 2 given ( ) 4 . 2 and ( ) ( ) 39 . 2 38 . 2 -  for 
the Post-Apartheid South African economy( ) 1995 = - period initial , we need to obtain 
the estimated values of the parameters as well as those of initial conditions.  
We obtain the parameters of the production function as follows. First, we normalize 
technology parameterA  to 1, and then estimate a using the following formula: 
  ( ), 1 GDP CSUL - = a   ( ) 1 . B  
where CSUL  is the compensation of skilled plus compensation of unskilled labor -the 
equivalent of  Z in the  CRS production function given in ( ) 13 . 2 - and  GDP is the 
aggregate output. South Africa’s data on  GDP CSUL is obtained from the Version 5 of 
GTAP Aggregate Database 2004.                                                                                                     
To estimate the initial per capita physical capital stock( ) 0 k , we use the South 
Africa’s data on per capita real investment ( ) t i  from Summer and Heston’s Penn Tables 
Version 6.2 to construct a series of the capital stock according the following rule: 
, ) 1 ( 1 t t k t i k k + - = + d   ( ) 2 . B  
,
0 0 T T k k =   ( ) 3 . B        
where  , 1995 0 = T and  k d is the depreciation rate of capital stock, which is calculated from 
the South Africa’s data from the Version 5 of GTAP Aggregate Database 2004 using the 
following expression:  46 
( ), VKB VDEP k = d   ( ) 4 . B           
where VKB and VDEP  are the Value of Capital Stock at the Beginning of period and the 
Value of Depreciation of Capital Stock, respectively. We choose 
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The initial per capita human capital is the average years of schooling of population 
aged 15 year old and over for the year 1995 from Barro and Lee (2000), and the human 



























15,  ( ) 6 . B   
where 
25
t h  is the average years of schooling of the population aged 25 and over. 
Furthermore, x  is obtained in the following way. First, note that if all effort is allocated 
to the accumulation of human capital( ) 0 = u , the marginal product of h &  with respect to 
g  is:  
( ) ( ) fx = - D - D - - 1 1 t t t t g g h h  
where the numerator is the change in investment in human capital and the denominator is 
the change in expenditures on education. Using data on Human capital (measured by 
                                                 
14 This rule is taken from “Econ 8107 Macroeconomics”, Spring 2005, University of Minnesota. 
15 Using the average years of schooling for the population aged 15 and over yields a value of 0.02 for this 
parameter. This value yields in turn a negative value for the  s BGP'  rate of growthg . This is the reason 
why we decide to use the average years of schooling for the population aged 25 and over.  47 
average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2000)) and expenditures on education 
and training over 1995-2000, we obtain fx , which we divide by f  to get x .  
The tax rates as well as the GDP’s share of spending on education are obtained from 
the South Africa’s national budgets over 1995-2006. The average national budget share 
of GDP over 1995-2006 have represented 30.1%. Since we have assumed a balanced 
budget, we reduce this share to the tax revenue share of GDP, which is 29%. Recall also 
that we have assumed that the economy is closed. This assumption implies that tax 
revenue does not include excise duties. The average excise duties’ share of GDP is 4%. 
Subtracting this average excise duties’ share of GDP from the tax revenue share of GDP 
yields the expenditure’s share of GDP of 25%. For simplicity, we assume that capital and 
labor incomes are taxed at the same rate. This implies that  . 25 . 0 = = u k t t  Also, the 
average GDP share of spending on education  h h from these national budget data is 7%. In 
terms of the balanced budget with closed economy, this share represents 27% of budget. 
The budget share of transfers  T h is the complement to unity of  h h , that is  %. 73 = T h  
The preference parameters  ( ) s r,  and the savings rate  ( ) s are determined jointly 
from the SS conditions( ) ( ). 39 . 2 38 . 2 -  Recall from these conditions that  ss r  is given by: 
( ) ( ) k ss r t gs r - + = 1 or  ( ) ss ss ss ss h u k A r ˆ ˆ 1 - =
a a   ( ) 7 . B  
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g a t a t h
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which we can rewrite as:  48 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) , ˆ ˆ 1 1 0 ss ss k u h k c r - - + - - = g a a t a t h      or  ( ) 9 . B   
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]. 1 1 ˆ ˆ a t a t h g a k u h ss k c r + - - + =   ( ) 10 . B  
Setting ( ) ( ) 10 . 7 . B B =  and rearrange yields: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) { } ( )( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] . 1 1 ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 1 r a t a t h t a t a s a t a t h g k u h ss k k k u h k c + - - - - = - - + - -  
  ( ) 11 . B  
Substitute ( ) 39 . 2 for ( )ss k c ˆ ˆ  into ( ) 11 . B and rearrange to get: 
gs r y fxh f + = +
2
ss h u   ( ) 12 . B  
Substitute ( ) 39 . 2  for y  and  ss u into ( ) 12 . B  and rearrange to obtain: 
() ()
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For a given value of  , r ( ) 13 . B  is solved for s and s using Newton iteration method.  
The values of parameters from this exercise are summarized in the following table:  
Table 1: Parameters' Values 
A  a  k d   0 k   0 h   f  x   u k t t =   h h   r  s   s 
1.00  0.451  0.04  11. 56  6.03  0.116  0.034  0.25 0.27  0.068 0.10 1.46 
 